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06 Kasım 2011 Pazar 17:51:56 |
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30 Mart 2012 Cuma 13:25:15
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:-) ఈ టప చ ల బ గ ద . ఇద మ డ జ నర బ బ అన నమ ట. చ ల బ గ ద . ఒక ఒక క ఉచ త సలహ ...హ డర ల ఉన న చ త ర బర వ క స త తగ గ చ డ . ప జ త దరగ ల డ అవ త ద . ప డవ క డ ...800*600 resolution ల హ డర మ త రమ సగ ప జ న ఆక రమ స త దన నద .
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30 Mart 2012 Cuma 13:25:18
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:-) ఈ టప చ ల బ గ ద . ఇద మ డ జ నర బ బ అన నమ ట. చ ల బ గ ద . ఒక ఒక క ఉచ త సలహ ...హ డర ల ఉన న చ త ర బర వ క స త తగ గ చ డ . ప జ త దరగ ల డ అవ త ద . ప డవ క డ ...800*600 resolution ల హ డర మ త రమ సగ ప జ న ఆక రమ స త దన నద .
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30 Mart 2012 Cuma 13:25:21
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:-) ఈ టప చ ల బ గ ద . ఇద మ డ జ నర బ బ అన నమ ట. చ ల బ గ ద . ఒక ఒక క ఉచ త సలహ ...హ డర ల ఉన న చ త ర బర వ క స త తగ గ చ డ . ప జ త దరగ ల డ అవ త ద . ప డవ క డ ...800*600 resolution ల హ డర మ త రమ సగ ప జ న ఆక రమ స త దన నద .
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30 Mart 2012 Cuma 16:46:25
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ర జ గ ర , heading మ ర స త న న న . ట మ ఉ డట ల ద . ర నగ ల మ య చ గ ర గ ల వ స న పర శ ధ చ . క త త ర గ ల క డ వ స త త వరల . వ హ ర
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30 Mart 2012 Cuma 16:46:26
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ర జ గ ర , heading మ ర స త న న న . ట మ ఉ డట ల ద . ర నగ ల మ య చ గ ర గ ల వ స న పర శ ధ చ . క త త ర గ ల క డ వ స త త వరల . వ హ ర
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31 Mart 2012 Cumartesi 00:58:37
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You're making a big mkaiste when you're describing the crisis. It's not a crisis of public borrowing. Ireland and Spain ran budget surpluses until 2008. It's a normal cyclical depression, the kind that could be over in a year if governments were willing to engage in temporary deficit spending, on the model of Sweden in the 1930s, Japan in the early 1930s, or even the American New Deal, which was much smaller and therefore only led to partial recovery (for full recovery, try WW2 spending). This is more or less what was done in South Korea, which recovered fine. China did the same in fact its policy was so successful it's fully recovered, and has problems with inflation rather than unemployment.The class issue is therefore different from what you're portraying. It's not some deep economic crisis of capitalism; establishmentarian parties can and have fixed such situations before. Rather, it's a deep political crisis, about the elite's unwillingness to do anything about mass unemployment. Instead, it's more worried about debt for purely moral reasons (see e.g. the British austerity plan, before which the UK was recovering fine), and especially about the prospect of inflation. If you're in the elite, then 10% unemployment does not affect you, but 5% inflation does. The credit downgrade comes from the same moralistic view of debt for example, the US downgrade in the summer came from a $2 trillion computational error that the S&P didn't bother fixing. It was about sending a message, not about honest economic analysis. Thus the elites give up on economic growth and prefer stagnation that maintains their power and values.Thus, the European Central Bank is engaging in monetary austerity, and demanding that countries engage in fiscal austerity. Germany is doing well, not because of its welfare state (which is actually smaller than that of France), but because its currency is undervalued relative to that of the European periphery, which makes it easy for it to export to it. The proper solution would be to allow moderate inflation in the Eurozone, say 4-5%, so that Germany will have some inflation and get its prices in line with those of the more peripheral Eurozone countries; however, Germany thinks it's imprudent, for wrong political reasons. Tellingly, the countries that are doing best right now are those that control their own currencies: the UK, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland. (Finland is doing okay, but in the last few months it's been doing worse than Sweden). That Germany's penchant for stable prices is leading to 20% unemployment in Spain is irrelevant to the German elites, which have convinced the world that Germany is a more serious country than Spain, never mind that before the crisis Germany was running budget deficits and Spain was running surpluses.On a more nitpicky note, the government in Hungary is center-right, not extreme right; the extreme right is a separate party. And it's not limiting the vote to ethnic Hungarians; that may be the ultimate intention, but right now what it's done is just redefine Hungarianness in the new constitution. Most of its more pernicious actions are economic and political rather than ethnic: loss of judicial independence, electoral constituencies frozen so as to maintain party rule, constitutionally mandated flat tax, nonpolitical regulatory positions stacked with party loyalists.
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31 Mart 2012 Cumartesi 00:58:39
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You're making a big mkaiste when you're describing the crisis. It's not a crisis of public borrowing. Ireland and Spain ran budget surpluses until 2008. It's a normal cyclical depression, the kind that could be over in a year if governments were willing to engage in temporary deficit spending, on the model of Sweden in the 1930s, Japan in the early 1930s, or even the American New Deal, which was much smaller and therefore only led to partial recovery (for full recovery, try WW2 spending). This is more or less what was done in South Korea, which recovered fine. China did the same in fact its policy was so successful it's fully recovered, and has problems with inflation rather than unemployment.The class issue is therefore different from what you're portraying. It's not some deep economic crisis of capitalism; establishmentarian parties can and have fixed such situations before. Rather, it's a deep political crisis, about the elite's unwillingness to do anything about mass unemployment. Instead, it's more worried about debt for purely moral reasons (see e.g. the British austerity plan, before which the UK was recovering fine), and especially about the prospect of inflation. If you're in the elite, then 10% unemployment does not affect you, but 5% inflation does. The credit downgrade comes from the same moralistic view of debt for example, the US downgrade in the summer came from a $2 trillion computational error that the S&P didn't bother fixing. It was about sending a message, not about honest economic analysis. Thus the elites give up on economic growth and prefer stagnation that maintains their power and values.Thus, the European Central Bank is engaging in monetary austerity, and demanding that countries engage in fiscal austerity. Germany is doing well, not because of its welfare state (which is actually smaller than that of France), but because its currency is undervalued relative to that of the European periphery, which makes it easy for it to export to it. The proper solution would be to allow moderate inflation in the Eurozone, say 4-5%, so that Germany will have some inflation and get its prices in line with those of the more peripheral Eurozone countries; however, Germany thinks it's imprudent, for wrong political reasons. Tellingly, the countries that are doing best right now are those that control their own currencies: the UK, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland. (Finland is doing okay, but in the last few months it's been doing worse than Sweden). That Germany's penchant for stable prices is leading to 20% unemployment in Spain is irrelevant to the German elites, which have convinced the world that Germany is a more serious country than Spain, never mind that before the crisis Germany was running budget deficits and Spain was running surpluses.On a more nitpicky note, the government in Hungary is center-right, not extreme right; the extreme right is a separate party. And it's not limiting the vote to ethnic Hungarians; that may be the ultimate intention, but right now what it's done is just redefine Hungarianness in the new constitution. Most of its more pernicious actions are economic and political rather than ethnic: loss of judicial independence, electoral constituencies frozen so as to maintain party rule, constitutionally mandated flat tax, nonpolitical regulatory positions stacked with party loyalists.
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31 Mart 2012 Cumartesi 00:58:41
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You're making a big mkaiste when you're describing the crisis. It's not a crisis of public borrowing. Ireland and Spain ran budget surpluses until 2008. It's a normal cyclical depression, the kind that could be over in a year if governments were willing to engage in temporary deficit spending, on the model of Sweden in the 1930s, Japan in the early 1930s, or even the American New Deal, which was much smaller and therefore only led to partial recovery (for full recovery, try WW2 spending). This is more or less what was done in South Korea, which recovered fine. China did the same in fact its policy was so successful it's fully recovered, and has problems with inflation rather than unemployment.The class issue is therefore different from what you're portraying. It's not some deep economic crisis of capitalism; establishmentarian parties can and have fixed such situations before. Rather, it's a deep political crisis, about the elite's unwillingness to do anything about mass unemployment. Instead, it's more worried about debt for purely moral reasons (see e.g. the British austerity plan, before which the UK was recovering fine), and especially about the prospect of inflation. If you're in the elite, then 10% unemployment does not affect you, but 5% inflation does. The credit downgrade comes from the same moralistic view of debt for example, the US downgrade in the summer came from a $2 trillion computational error that the S&P didn't bother fixing. It was about sending a message, not about honest economic analysis. Thus the elites give up on economic growth and prefer stagnation that maintains their power and values.Thus, the European Central Bank is engaging in monetary austerity, and demanding that countries engage in fiscal austerity. Germany is doing well, not because of its welfare state (which is actually smaller than that of France), but because its currency is undervalued relative to that of the European periphery, which makes it easy for it to export to it. The proper solution would be to allow moderate inflation in the Eurozone, say 4-5%, so that Germany will have some inflation and get its prices in line with those of the more peripheral Eurozone countries; however, Germany thinks it's imprudent, for wrong political reasons. Tellingly, the countries that are doing best right now are those that control their own currencies: the UK, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland. (Finland is doing okay, but in the last few months it's been doing worse than Sweden). That Germany's penchant for stable prices is leading to 20% unemployment in Spain is irrelevant to the German elites, which have convinced the world that Germany is a more serious country than Spain, never mind that before the crisis Germany was running budget deficits and Spain was running surpluses.On a more nitpicky note, the government in Hungary is center-right, not extreme right; the extreme right is a separate party. And it's not limiting the vote to ethnic Hungarians; that may be the ultimate intention, but right now what it's done is just redefine Hungarianness in the new constitution. Most of its more pernicious actions are economic and political rather than ethnic: loss of judicial independence, electoral constituencies frozen so as to maintain party rule, constitutionally mandated flat tax, nonpolitical regulatory positions stacked with party loyalists.
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